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BE NICE - OR I'LL SUE: IS THIS A NEW PERIGEE FOR
FAA/CUSTOMER RELATIONS? COX & NOVICKIS V.
5-STATE HELICOPTERS, INC. A CLASH OF
PERSONAL AND PUBLIC RIGHTS
CHRIS KILGORE*

JONATHAN CUNNINGHAM
HAYS HETTINGER

DE MONTESQUIEU'S RULE:
The wording of laws should mean the same thing to all men.
I.

SUMMARY

A

FTER A FEDERAL Aviation Administration (FAA) ramp inspection, an air taxi operator wrote letters complaining to
its Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) and to the Regional
Headquarters about the conduct of the Aviation Safety Inspectors (ASIs), in particular about what was perceived as unfair and
unsafe practices by the inspectors while conducting the ramp
check. A single, minor infraction was found by the FAA, resulting in the issuance of an administrative warning letter to the
operator. Regarding the certificate holder's operations, the
matter was closed. Following a further investigation of the inspectors' conduct, the Regional Office substantiated and acted
to internally correct some of the operator's complaints.
Shockingly, the inspectors individually later sued the operator
and its officials in a state court for defamation, charging that the

* Chris Kilgore is of counsel with the law firm of Winstead Sechrest & Minick,
P.C. in Dallas, Texas and a former U.S. Army and Coast Guard aviator. Jonathan
Cunningham is a senior associate with the law firm of Winstead Sechrest &
Minick P.C. in Dallas and a former Army aviator. Hays Hettinger, former
Assistant Chief Counsel of the FAA, is a consultant to the Winstead firm. All of
the authors participated in the defense of the case studied. They wish to thank
Fred Meier, a shareholder at Winstead and former Marine Corps aviator, for his
review in the preparation of this article and assistance during the defense of this
case.

239

240

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

letters to their superiors had damaged their reputations in the
workplace and subjected them to "embarrassment, humiliation
and mental anguish."
While the FAA is not a party, this litigation does not encourage support for the concept of "FAA/Customer" relations,
at the very time the agency has been advancing its so-called
"partnership" with industry. As federal employees, the inspectors enjoy immunity from other-than-certain constitutional torts,
but under federal law, the operator has no equivalent protection. We go to great lengths to protect individuals from retaliation by their aviation employers and others when they "blow the
whistle" on safety violations or fraud, waste and abuse. But it
appears that somewhere along the way, we have neglected to
protect them from-guess whom?-FAA inspectors "here to
help us."
Regardless of how one sees the merits of the cases reviewed
here, it seems to us that it is patently unfair for an inspector,
offended by a certificate holder's complaints to the agency concerning the inspector's performance of official conduct, to be
allowed to then personally retaliate against the certificate
holder. The "chilling" effect this has on the sometimes tenuous,
sometimes litigious and always fragile relationship between the
FAA and an intensely regulated industry is obvious. At best, in
defending itself the operator will expend tens of thousands of
dollars that are unrecoverable. At worst, the operator could lose
its business. In either event, in the eyes of the operator, it has
been betrayed by the FAA, even though the government is not
party. Surely, this is contrary to Stephen Covey's best advice-a
"lose-lose" situation for both the operator and the government.
Similar state suits have been filed in Texas and Arizona. Therefore, this may be only the beginning of a very unwelcome trend.
THE TWO LEAST CREDIBLE
SENTENCES IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE:
1. The check is in the mail.
2. I'm from the government and I'm here to help you.
Imagine this:
You are on the ramp when you are approached by an FAA
Aviation Safety Inspector ("ASI"). He wants to "take a look" at
your certificates/aircraft/operation. He appears to be rude,
obnoxious, and he seems intent on finding a violation. Anything that appears to be resistance on your part draws an in-

2005]

FAA/CUSTOMER RELATIONS

stant admonition and a reminder of the seemingly
omnipotent power he wields. This is underscored by the fact
that the inspection suddenly seems to move into slow motion,
further delaying your travel. Nevertheless, the inspection is
eventually concluded and you are unaware that any violation
was found. You are unhappy with the experience, but
relieved.
Later, the more you think about what happened, the more
angry you become. So, at the first opportunity, you fire off a
letter to your "friendly" FSDO complaining about the inspector, noting in particular his unprofessional and confrontational attitude. In response, you get a brief letter from the
FSDO stating that they are looking into it. Months later, you
get a follow-up letter stating that the investigation of your
complaint is complete, apologizing for any perceived lack of
courtesy, reminding you that the FAA inspector indeed does
have the power to delay you and inspect you, telling you that
appropriate follow-up actions will be taken, and concluding
with the obligatory "thank you for your interest in aviation
safety." You know a bureaucratic response when you see one;
but you did get a chance to vent and hopefully, having called
the FSDO's attention to the problem, the inspector will be a
bit more careful in the future. All things considered, you are
satisfied.
A year later, you are in shock when you are served with a
lawsuit. The FAA inspector has sued you for defamation, alleging that your complaint letter has injured him, that he has
suffered mental anguish and humiliation, and that his job has
been adversely affected. You can't believe it! Surely, this
can't be right! You soon learn that the inspector can indeed
do this. Your lawyer thinks it is a weak case for the inspector,
hut it is going to cost you plenty to prove you are right. Even
worse, there is always a chance that you could still lose, even if
you are right.
You open the proverbial can of "alphabet soup" and contact
your concerned industry association, and the FAA's Washington headquarters. Everyone tells you that this has to be the
most ridiculous thing that they've heard and they share your
indignation, but you quickly learn that, for the most part, you
are on your own. You get a lot of sympathy, but little else.
However, from the FAA, you won't even get that.
You will also soon learn that you are about to embark on
what-trite, but true to say- will be a Sisyphean task, at-
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tempted up a "rigged" course (remember, Sisyphus was
doomed to roll the heavy stone uphill in Hades, where you
too will feel you are). The FAA will not be a party to the suit
but will stand by while one of its inspectors sues a "customer."
To make matters worse, you will find that getting information
from the FAA which might help you will be an exercise in
futility. Others may have complained to the FSDO before,
and the manager there may have even apologized for this guy
on occasion. But chances are that those past incidents are not
reported in his official personnel file and, no matter what was
said before, no one at the FSDO is going to testify against him
on the record. The cost to you is going to be high and the
risk great, but you've got no choice. You have been drawn
into the turbulent, murky and unpredictable world of
litigation.
To add insult to injury, you are soon faced with the classic
conundrum of this seemingly dark netherworld. You are informed that the inspector will take a relatively modest fivefigure sum to settle the case-"modest" in comparison to the
damages you are being sued for, anyway. You don't believe
you have done anything wrong, and you don't believe for a
nanosecond that the inspector has been injured in any way.
But the cost of proving you are right is going to be much
more than the cost of settling, and even then your lawyer will
not give you any assurance that you will not end up paying
those costs plus the amount of damages claimed by the
inspector.
One thing is certain: no matter what our unfortunate airman/operator decides to do, he or she will forever be disillusioned and angry-not only at the inspector who caused all of
this, but also at the entire justice system. And all for good
reason. Win, lose, or draw, the relationship between the regulator and the regulated is forever altered. It makes no difference that the inspector might be a renegade or that he is not
representative of the vast majority of government servants.
Then, there are the practical considerations. Once a personal suit is filed against a certificate holder by an inspector,
can that inspector ever again credibly resume a position of
regulating the defendant? How about that inspector's coworkers and friends? How about others at the FSDO named
by the inspector as his witnesses? How does the FSDO manager schedule his workforce when one or more of them is in
personal litigation against certificate holders in his district?
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What if the only inspectors in the FSDO that have experience
in the specialty of the certificate holder's operations are or
have been involved in a personal lawsuit against the certificate
holder?
Is this scenario a fantasy? A fairy tale? Hyperbole? Hardly!
It is a phenomenon that could get worse before it gets better.
Inspectors have sued and won, even when the damages
claimed were speculative at best. Word has spread among
them that they "don't have to take it any more," and that they
might even make a little money. These suits, even when motivated by little more than retaliation or greed, can be sustained. Protected by the shield of governmental immunity,
the risk to the inspector, if any, is negligible. Unless and until
this situation is restrained by new case law or federal law or
policy, it can be abused. And if it can be abused, it will be.
Before we begin a discussion of an actual case, a short primer on defamation is appropriate, as this is not an area of the
law routinely presented to aviation practitioners. No attempt
is made to wade into the finer nuances of the law of defamation, but be forewarned there are many.
II.

DEFAMATION

Defamation is defined as the act of "harming the reputation
of another by making a false statement to a third person. If the
alleged defamation involves a matter of public concern, the
plaintiff is constitutionally required to prove both the statement's falsity and the defendant's fault."'
"A communication is defamatory if it tends to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing
with him."2 The meaning of a communication is that which the
recipient correctly, or mistakenly but reasonably, understands
that it was intended to express.'
Libel is defamation expressed in a fixed medium, especially a
writing, but also a picture, sign, or electronic broadcast, while
I BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 448 (8th ed. 2004). "Defamation ... is involved in
two related harms, libel and slander. A familiar statement is that libel is written
whereas slander is oral. This covers the idea in a general way but tends to mislead because defamation may be published without the use of words and hence
be neither written nor oral." Id.
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 559 (1997).
1 Id. § 563.

244

JOURNAL OFAIR LAW AND COMMERCE

slander is defamation expressed in a transitory form, especially
speech.4
These terms may also be defined by state statute. For example, libel is defined in Texas as "a defamation expressed in written or other graphic form that tends to blacken the memory of
the dead or that tends to injure a living person's reputation and
thereby expose the person to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or financial injury or to impeach any person's honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation or to publish the natural defects of
anyone and thereby expose the person to public hatred, ridicule
or financial injury."5
Context and perspective are important. "We have long held
that an allegedly defamatory publication should be construed as
a whole in light of the surrounding circumstances based upon
how a person of ordinary intelligence would perceive it."6 A
threshold question of law is whether the communication is reasonably capable of defamatory meaning.' Importantly, the opinion of the parties has no bearing on whether the complained of
words are actually defamatory.'
Only statements of fact can be defamatory. To be actionable,
the statement of fact must be objectively verifiable. 9 Opinion,
even rhetorical hyperbole, is not actionable. 10 Further,
"[w]hether words are capable of the defamatory meaning the
plaintiff attributes to them is a question of law for the court.""
935, 1421 (8th ed. 2004).
§73.001 (Vernon 2005).
6 Turner v. KTRK Television, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 103, 114 (Tex. 2000).
7 Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1989).
8 Musser v. Smith, 690 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985),
affd, 723 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. 1987); see also Farias C. Bexar County Bd. of Trustees
for Mental Health Mental Retardation Servs., 925 F.2d 866, 878 (5th Cir. 1991)
("[plaintiffs] opinion of the statements has no bearing on whether they were
defamatory"); Patton v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 910 F. Supp. 1250, 1272 (S.D.
Tex. 1995) ("A plaintiffs opinion of the statements has no bearing on whether
they were defamatory."); Dolcefino v. Randolph, 19 S.W.3d 906, 918 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2000), affd, Turner, 38 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. 2000) (holding
that a plaintiff s conclusory statement that "[t]his was false, defamatory, and has
injured me in my profession" is insufficient to prove falsity).
9 See Turner, 38 S.W.3d at 114.
10Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 17-20, (1990); Gaylord Broad.
Co. v. Francis, 7 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, pet. denied); see also
Eric Scott Fulcher, Rhetorical Hyperbole and the Reasonable Person Standard:Drawing
the Line Between FigurativeExpression and FactualDefamation, 38 GA. L. REv. 717, 731
(2004).
I Dolcefino, 19 S.W.3d at 917 (citing Musser v. Smith Protective Servs., Inc., 723
S.W.2d 653 (Tex. 1987)).
4 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

5 TEX. Clv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN.
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"In making this determination, [the court] must construe the
statement as a whole in light of the surrounding
circumstances..."12
A.

DEFAMATION PER SE

Sometimes, words are defamatory in and of themselves and
are not capable of an innocent meaning.13 They are actionable
on their face and, if proven, damages are presumed. 4 Words
actionable per se include: imputation of a crime, a loathsome disease, unchastity, or words affecting plaintiffs business, trade,
profession, office or calling.' 5
"The publication of defamatory matter, actionable per se, entitles the person defamed to compensation for the actual injury
done him without regard to the motive with which the publication was made and want of actual intent to injure or defame
furnishes no legal excuse."1 6
B.

STANDARD OF CONDUCT /

LIABILITY

In defining the standard of conduct and determining whether
a statement is defamatory, the standards vary, depending on
who is allegedly being defamed, by whom, and within what process. Obviously, the law affords private individuals the most protection. Public figures, such as celebrities, or public officials,
such as candidates for office or those in offices of interest to the
public, are afforded less protection. In the instance of public
persons, the speaker has a qualified immunity; that is, for a statement to be actionable, it must be made with knowledge that is it
not true. 17
"To maintain a defamation cause of action, the plaintiff must
prove that the defendant: (1) published a statement; (2) that
was defamatory concerning the plaintiff; (3) while acting with
either actual malice, if the plaintiff was a public official or public
figure, or negligence, if the plaintiff was a private individual, regarding the truth of the statement."' 8
12 Id.
13 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 499 (8th ed. 2004).

14 53

C.J.S. Libel & Slander § 43 (1987).

15 See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 449 (8th ed. 2004).

16 53 C.J.S. Libel & Slander § 43 (1987).
17 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
18 WFAA-TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex. 1998).
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In some instances, such as judicial proceedings, all speech is
protected, and an absolute privilege applies.1 9 Absolute privilege is also referred to as an immunity. 2° An absolutely privileged communication is one for which, due to the occasion
upon which it is made, no civil remedy exists, even though the
communication is false and was made or published with express
malice. 21 This doctrine has been firmly established in Texas for
well over one hundred years.2 2
The absolute privilege applies to communications related to
both proposed and existing judicial proceedings, but also extends to quasi-judicial proceedings, those governmental functions where free speech, without threat of retribution, is
23
desired.
[T] he rationale for extending an absolute privilege to quasijudicial proceedings rests in the public policy consideration that
every citizen should have the unqualified right to appeal to the
19 James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914, 916-17 (Tex. 1982) ("Communications in
the due course of ajudicial proceeding will not serve as the basis of a civil action
for libel or slander, regardless of the neglience or malice with which they are
made. Reagan v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 140 Tex. 105, 166 S.W.2d 909 (1942).
This privilege extends to any statement made by the judge, jurors, counsel, parties or witnesses, and attaches to all aspects of the proceedings, including statements made in open court, pre-trial hearings, depositions, affidavits and any of
the pleadings or other papers in the case.") see also Thomas v. Bracey, 940 S.W.2d
340, 343 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ) ("This absolute privilege has
been extended to communications made in comtemplation of and preliminary to
judicial proceedings.")
20 See Hurlbut v. Gulf Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 749 S.W.2d 762, 768 (Tex. 1987)
(stating that "absolute privilege is more properly thought of as an immunity because it is based on the personal position or status of the actor"); Attaya v.
Shoukfeh, 962 S.W.2d 237, 239 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998, pet. denied) (referring to absolute privilege as an immunity).
21 See Bird v. W.C.W., 868 S.W.2d 767, 771-72 (Tex. 1994);James,637 S.W.2d at
916; Reagan, 166 S.W.2d at 912.
22 See Runge v. Franklin, 10 S.W. 721, 723 (Tex. 1889).
23 James, 637 S.W.2d at 917; Reagan, 166 S.W.2d at 912-13; Randolph v. Jackson
Walker, L.L.P., 29 S.W.3d 271, 278 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet.
denied); see also Bailey v. Superior Ct., 636 P.2d 144, 146 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981)
(holding that a complaint made to quasi-judicial body absolutely privileged);
Drummond v. Stahl, 618 P.2d 616, 620 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981), (complaint made to
quasi-judicial body is absolutely privileged); Piper M.Willhite, Defamation Law:
Privileges from. Liability: Distinguishing Quasi-Judicial Proceedings from Proceedings
which are Preliminary to Judicial Hearings, 47 OKLA. L. REv. 541, 562 (1994) (concluding that an absolute privilege applies in Oklahoma to quasi-judicial proceedings). A concise summary of the current law in Texas regarding the privilege in
quasi-judicial proceedings is given by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas in Khan v. United Recovery Systems, Inc., No. Civ.H-032292, 2005 WL 469603 (S.D.Tex.).
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agencies of government for redress "without the fear of being
called to answer in damages," and that the administration ofjustice will be better served if "witnesses are not deterred by fear of
lawsuits.

'2 4

In fact, the United States Supreme Court has recog-

nized the right to petition as "among the most
precious of the
25
liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.

However, what constitutes a quasi-judicial proceeding is a subject of debate and varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Texas
courts have recognized six factors that are relevant to whether
proceedings are quasi-judicial for purposes of absolute immunity.21 Professor Keeton has stated that the central factors to
consider in determining whether an administrative body or
agency possesses quasi-judicial power are: (1) whether the administrative body is vested with discretion based upon investigation and consideration of evidentiary facts; (2) whether the
body is entitled to hold hearings and decide the issue by the
application of rules of law to the facts; and (3) whether the
body's power affects the personal or property rights of private
persons. 27 Some states extend absolute privilege to administrative proceedings.2" Additionally, media defendants are typically
afforded some privilege in reporting. 29 In Texas, there is a specific statute regarding libel actions against newspapers and
broadcasters."
C.

PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS -

No

PRIVILEGE

No culpable mental state is required for proving defamation
of a private individual. In both libel and slander, the issues are
24 Gallegos v. Escalon, 993 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999,
no pet.) (quoting Hernandez v. Hayes, 931 S.W.2d 648, 651 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1996, writ denied)).
25 United Mine Workers of Am. v. Ill. Bar Ass'n., 389 U.S. 217. 222 (1967).
2 Shanks v. Alliedsignal, Inc., 169 F.3d 988, 993-94 (5th Cir. 1999); Village of
Bayou Vista v. Glaskox, 899 S.W.2d 826, 829 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1995, no writ).
27 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 114 (5th
ed. 1984).
28 See Smith v. McDonald, 895 F.2d 147, 149 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating that "communications made in the course of an administrative proceeding are absolutely
privileged if the administrative officer or agency is exercising a judicial or quasijudicial function") (citing MazztIco v. N.C. Bd. Of Medical Exam'rs, 228 S.E.2d
529 (N.C. App. 1976); Angel v. Ward, 258 S.E.2d 788, 792 (N.C. App. 1979) (stating that North Carolina law grants an absolute privilege in administrative
proceedings).
29 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 327-28, (1974).
311 TEX. CIr. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 73.001-.006 (Vernon 2005).
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whether the utterance was made, whether it was false, whether it
damaged the complainant, and whether the speaker had a privilege." Whether the defendant intended to say or publish the
defamatory words is not an element of the cause of action, unless privilege is involved. 2 Even innocent, mistaken publication
may subject the defamer to liability. 3
D.

PUBLIC FIGURES AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS

-

QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE

Public officials and public figures must establish a higher degree of fault. They must prove that the defendant published a
defamatory falsehood with 'actual malice,'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not. 34 Actual malice requires a showing of either deliberate falsification or reckless publication, "despite the pub' 35
lisher's awareness of probable falsity.
Reckless disregard has further been determined to mean that
the defendant entertained a serious doubt as to the truth of the
publication . 3 6 "Reckless disregard is a subjective standard, focusing on the defendant's state of mind."3 7
Actual malice is a "term of art" in the defamation context, 8
and "'is unfortunately confusing in that it has nothing to do
with bad motive or ill will,' but rather it is a 'shorthand to describe the First Amendment protections for speech injurious to
OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
See Hornby v. Hunter, 385 S.W.2d 473, 476 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1964, no writ); see also Express Publ's. Co. v. Lancaster, 2 S.W.2d 833, 834 (Tex.
1928); 50 TEX. JUR. 3D Libel & Slander § 12 (1986) (noting that intent is not an
element of defamation).
33 Hornby, 385 S.W.2d at 476.
34 N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80. The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that its choice of the term "actual malice" in defamation cases as
meaning knowing falsity and reckless disregard for the truth was unfortunate,
since the term is easily confused with common-law malice. Id.; see Masson v. New
Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 511 (1991). Actual malice in defamation
cases is not used in the common law sense of hatred, ill-will, enmity, or wanton
desire to injure. Id.
35 Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967).
36 Forbes, Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 167, 171 (Tex. 2003)
(citing St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, (1968)).
37 New Times, Inc. v. Bruce Isaacks, 146 S.W.3d 144, 162 (Tex. 2004).
38 Forbes, Inc., 124 S.W.3d at 171.
31 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
32
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reputation.' ''
"Constitutional malice generally consists of
"[c] alculated falsehood.4°
The law is clear that actual malice is not a difference of opinion as to the truth of the matter. 4 1 Actual malice is not ill will,
spite, hatred, or desire to injure.' And, actual malice cannot be
based on a witness' lack of credibility. 43 Further, failure to investigate the truth or falsity of the statement before it is published,
standing alone, is insufficient to show actual malice.4 4
Moreover, the defendant's testimony that he believed what he
said is not conclusive, irrespective of all other evidence. The
evidence must be viewed in its entirety, and the defendant's
state of mind is often proved by circumstantial evidence. The
Texas Supreme Court has stated:
A lack of care or an injurious motive in making a statement is not
alone proof of actual malice, but care and motive are factors to
be considered. An understandable misinterpretation of ambiguous facts does not show actual malice, but inherently improbable
assertions and statements made on information that is obviously
dubious may show actual malice. A failure to investigate fully is
not evidence of actual malice; a purposeful avoidance of the
truth is. Imagining that something may be true is not the same
as belief.4 5 Actual malice must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 4 "

3" Bruce Isaacks, 146 S.W.3d at 161.

4( Forbes, Inc., 124 S.W.3d at 171 (citing Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561, 591
(Tex. 2002)).
4' Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Conaughten, 491 U.S. 657, 681
(1989).
42 Masson, 501 U.S. at 510.
43 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 512
(1984).
44 Harte-Hankes, 491 U.S. at 688; Doubleday v. Rogers, 674 S.W.2d 751, 756
(Tex. 1984).
45 Bentley, 94 S.W.3d at 596.
46 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342; N.Y Times, 376 U.S. at 285-286, (applying clear and
convincing standard to media defendant); Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 554
(Tex. 1989) (applying clear and convincing standard also to suits against private
individuals); see also Forbes, Inc., 124 S.W.3d at 172. These standards apply equally
to media and non-media defendants. See Alaniz v. Hoyt, 105 S.W.3d 330 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (citing Casso, 776 S.W.2d at 551) ("We are
reluctant to afford greater constitutional protections to members of the print and
broadcast media than to ordinary citizens ....
Therefore, we join those states
which have extended the New York Times standard to defamation suits by public
officials and public figures against non-media defendants.").
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1. Public Officials Expanded
It has been recognized that when the conduct of public officials is involved, there is an even greater level of protection afforded the citizen-critic, because it is as much the citizen's duty
to criticize as it is the official's duty to administer. 47 In concluding that such a privilege is required by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, Justice Brennan observed:
As Madison said, 'the censorial power is in the people over the
Government, and not the Government over the people.' It
would give public servants an unjustified preference over the
public they serve, if critics of official conduct did not have a fair
equivalent of the immunity granted to the officials themselves.4 8
This begs the question of exactly who may be considered a
public official and how far into the ranks of government the
public official designation should extend.4 9 The Supreme Court
did suggest the reach may be broad. Justice Brennan noted an
"oft-cited statement of a like rule" by a Kansas court in which the
court held that "[t] his privilege extends to a great variety of subof public concern, public men, and
jects and includes matters
50
candidates for office.
In Rosenblatt v. Baer, the Supreme Court provided more
guidance:
Criticism of government is at the very center of the constitutionally protected area of free discussion. Criticism of those responsible for government operations must be free, lest criticism of
government itself be penalized. It is clear, therefore, that the
'public official' designation applies at the very least to those
among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs.
Where a position in government has such apparent importance
that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications
and performance of the person who holds it, beyond the general
public interest in the qualifications and performance of all gov47 N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 282.
48 Id.
49 Whether a plaintiff is a public official for defamation purposes is a question

of law to be determined by the court. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85-86
(1966); HBO v. Harrison, 983 S.W.2d 31, 36-37 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
50 N.Y Times, 376 U.S. at 280-82.
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ernment employees, both elements identified in New York Times
51
are present and the New York Times malice standards apply.
It has been recognized that the Supreme Court has not reserved the public official designation for high level officers.5 2 In
St. Amant v. Thompson, the Court found that a deputy sheriff was
a public official, "at least5 where law enforcement and police
functions are concerned.
In HBO v. Harrison,the court concluded that public official
status was determined on the basis of authority and exercise of
that authority, finding that a non-government employee, a
court-appointed psychologist, was a public official because of
public interest reasons based on perceived responsibility. 54 Another Texas case held a child protective services (CPS) specialist
to be a "public official" under the New York Times rule.5 5 The
court held that the CPS specialist was a public official for defamation purposes because, by the nature of her duties, she exercised authority on the state's behalf, served as an investigator,
had the authority to recommend enforcement action, and had
substantial public contact relating to her official duties.5 6
In fact, the exact question of whether FAA investigators are
public officials" for the purposes of defamation was addressed
by an Arizona court of appeals in Lewis v. Oliver. After analyzing
the nature of the inspector's duties, the effect of an FAA inspector upon air transportation, and the resultant public interest;
the court simply and clearly held, "In short,... Lewis is a public

official and consequently must establish actual malice in order
to recover.

57

51 Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 85-86.
52 Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. 1976).
53 St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 730, n.2.
54 Harrison,983 S.W.2d at 37.
55 Villareal v. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 131,

134-35
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).
56 Id. at 135. The court additionally relied upon a non-exhaustive list of other
cases holding government employees who are in a position of employment with
powers which affect the lives, liberty, money, or property of citizens as "public
officials." See, e.g., Press, Inc. v. Verran, 569 S.W.2d 435, 441 (Tenn. 1978) (holding that a junior social worker is a public official); Hodges v. Okla. Journal Publ.
Co., 617 P.2d 191, 193 (Okla. 1980) (holding that a license tag agent is a public
official); Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Okla.
1978) (holding that a grade school wrestling coach is a public official); Ryan v.
Dionne, 248 A.2d 583, 585 (1968) (holding that a collector of delinquent taxes is
a public official).
57 Lewis v. Oliver, 873 P.2d 668, 675 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).
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Accordingly, aviation safety inspectors for the FAA are "public
officials" for the purposes of defamation and are thereby required, at a minimum (if absolute privilege weren't applicable),
to prove "actual malice" under the rule of New York Times.
Another Basis Requiring Actual Malice

2.

The malice standard also applies when the communications
complained of concern an individual who has an interest in the
matter and qualified immunity. More specifically, actual malice
applies to communications to public officials acting in their supervisory capacity when the communication is not related to an
ongoing judicial or a quasi-judicial proceeding.
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 598, Communications
to One Who May Act in the Public Interest (1977), provides that a
publication is conditionally privileged if: 1) there is information
that affects a sufficiently important public interest, and 2) the
public interest requires the communication of defamatory matter to a public officer who is authorized or privileged to take
action if the defamatory matter is true. Comment "e" explains
this rule and states:
The rule stated in this section is applicable to defamatory communications to public officials concerning matters that affect the
discharge of their duties. The duties of a public officer include

supervision of inferior officers, and this supervision in many
cases carries with it the power to remove or discipline the inferiors for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office, or to report the
misconduct to heads of departments or other persons having the
power of removal or discipline. In performing this duty of supervision, it is desirable that public officers have extensive information concerning the conduct of their subordinates in order that
they may intelligently exercise their discretion. Therefore, a defamatory publication made by a citizen to a public officer concerning the work of a subordinate under his control or
supervision is conditionally privileged.5 8
Thus, if a communication does not relate to an ongoing judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, by the virtue of an FAA inspector being a public official, as well as the privilege discussed in
the Restatement, the inspector would, at a minimum, always be
required to prove actual malice for defamation purposes.
58

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 598,

cmt. e.

(1977).
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DEFAMATION DISGUISED AS TORTIOUS
INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT

Plaintiffs, in the case study discussed here, attempted to characterize defamation claims as claims for tortious interference
with a contract or as business disparagement. This would appear to remove the claim from the defamation arena and to
avoid the requirement that the plaintiff establish actual malice
by a pubic official or public figure. Disguising a defamation
claim as a tortious interference or business disparagement claim
has also been used, at least in Texas, to attempt to avoid defamation's shorter one-year limitations period.
However, Texas courts, by applying a "looks like a duck,
quacks like a duck" corollary, have held that, no matter how artfully packaged, interference claims arising from an alleged defamatory communication are still claims for defamation. 59 The
Hurlbut court noted that claims of business disparagement and
tortious interference with contract arising from a defamation
claim were, in essence, a claim for slander. ' "To hold otherwise
would permit litigants to circumvent constitutional defenses
against the tort of libel by pleading torts that do not require
falsity or actual malice."'"
When a non libel claim is grounded on the same speech giving rise to a libel claim that requires a showing of malice, the
plaintiff must prove actual malice." Accordingly, where actual
malice would be required regarding a defamation claim, a plaintiff would also be required to prove by clear and convincing evidence both the falsity and the actual malice (by clear and
convincing evidence) for both the defamation claim and for the
asserted tort claim. The Texas Supreme Court has reiterated
the requirement of actual malice in a business disparagement
claim in Forbes Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 172
(Tex. 2003).
59 Hurlbut., 749 S.W. at 766-67.

60 Id. Recent decisions have held that where a privlege applies, it is to be applied to preclude all claims based on the communication, regardless of the label
of the claim. Khan, 2005 WL 469603, at *13 (citing Laub v. Pesikoff, 979 S.W.2d

686, 690-92 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied)).
61 KTRK Television, Inc. v. Fowkes, 981 S.W.2d 779, 789-90 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1991, writ denied). Likewise, courts have held that extension of absolute
privilege beyond defamation actions is necessary to avoid circumventing the policy behind the privilege. Laub, 979 S.W.2d at 690-92.
62 Fowkes, 981 S.W.2d at 789 (citing KTRK v. Felder, 950 S.W.2d 100, 108 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ) and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485

U.S. 46, 56 (1988)).
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F.

DEFAMATION DAMAGES

No attempt will be made here to discuss in depth the issue of
damages available in a defamation suit. For the purposes of this
article, it suffices to say that compensatory damages allowable
for defamation are divided into two categories: general and
special.
General damages include mental anguish, injury to reputation, and the like. These are damages that naturally flow from
the libel and are not easily susceptible to monetary valuation.6 3
The amount of general damages of injury to reputation and
mental anguish is often very difficult to determine, and ajury is
given wide discretion in its estimation of them. 64 However, general damages, beyond nominal damages, have been denied on
the basis of insufficient evidence when they are based only on
self-serving statements without other independent indicia of

injury.

65

Included as a form of special damages is lost earning capacity.6 6 Lost earning capacity, as a form of damages, must be specifically stated and proved.6 7
G.

PRACTICAL

ROAD BLOcKs-DIscovERY

ISSUES

In the case reviewed, the official personnel records acquired
under the federal Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) were either incomplete or so general as to be almost useless. However,
since they proved virtually nothing, this furthered the burden
on the plaintiff-inspectors to produce additional records in discovery. Interestingly, there was a noticeable difference between
personnel documents provided by the FAA and those provided
by the inspectors.
The defense will likely have great difficulty in discovering the
testimony of other FAA employees, with respect to the employment history of the plaintiff-inspectors, any past disciplinary acSeeW.T. Util. Co. v. Wills, 164 S.W.2d 405, 412 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1942,
no writ).
64 Evans v. McKay, 212 S.W. 680, 685 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1919, writ
dism'd).
65 Reveley v. Bird Publ'n, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 444, 446 (W.D. Tex. 1984).
66 M. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Richmond, 11 S.W. 555, 558 (Tex. 1889); Houston Belt &
Terminal Ry. Co. v. Wherry, 548 S.W.2d 743, 753 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1976, writ refd n.r.e.).
67 Kelly v. Diocese of Corpus Christi, 832 S.W.2d 88, 91 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1992, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Vista Chevrolet, Inc. v. Barron, 698 S.W.2d 435,
441 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).
63
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tions, the authentication of employment records, and other
relevant documents because of the infamous Touhy Rule (socalled after United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 46465 (1951)). Touhy regulations prohibit federal employees from
testifying in legal proceedings between private litigants without
the permission of the government. They also require compliance with conditions and limitations set by the governing agency
or department. The Department Of Transportation's Touhy
regulation, which governs the FAA, is found at 49 C.F.R. Part 9.
This regulation essentially limits testimony to one pre-trial deposition per employee, and then only with respect to facts and not
expert or opinion testimony.6" In other words, some of the key
issues in a defamation claim, such as reputation, promotion potential, or damage, will be completely off limits and excluded.
Even if warranted, one within the FAA will not be able to "speak
evil" of another employee, at least not on the record.
POP QUIZ FOR LAW STUDENTS AND OTHER
CONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLARS: QUARRELS THAT HAVE
SHAPED THE CONSTITUTION'
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

The Case of the Missing Commissions?
The Case of the Copperhead Conspirator?
The Case of the Unscrupulous Warehouseman?
The Case of the Prejudiced Doorkeeper?
The Case of the Louisiana Traveler? (NOT the Pelican
Brief!)
The Case of the Overworked Laundress?
The Sick Chicken Case?
The Case of the Wenatchee Chambermaid?
The Case of the Florida Drifter?

' From Quarrels that have Shaped the Constitution (Revised Edition), Edited by
John A. Garraty, Columbia University, Harper & Row (1987). (We have
provided the answers to items 1 through 9 in the Addendum.)
68 For an overview of the Touhy privilege, see Don Lively, Government Housekeeping Authority: BureaucraticPrivilegesWithout A BureaucraticPrivilege, 16 HARV. C.R.C.L.L. REv. 495 (1981); Robert R. Kiesel, Every Man's Evidence and the Ivory Tower
Agencies: How May a Civil Litigant Obtain Testimony From An Employee Of A Nonparty
Federal Agency?, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1647 (1991); Gregory S. Coleman, Touhy
and the Housekeeping Privilege: Dead But Not Buried?, 70 TEx. L. REv. 685 (1992);
Jason Grech, Exxon Shipping, The Power To Subpoena Federal Agency Employees, and
the Housekeeping Statute: Cleaning Up the Housekeeping Privilege for the ChimneySweeper's Benefit, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1137 (1996).
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III.

A CASE STUDY: 5-STATE HELICOPTERS, INC.

5-State Helicopters, Inc. v. Cox, 146 S.W.3d 254 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied)
A.

BACKGROUND

On November 20, 1998, two FAA Airworthiness Inspectors,
Brian Novickis and John Cox,6 9 on their way to inspect an A&P
training program at Texas State Technical College in Waco,
Texas, noticed two helicopters engaged in aerial lift operations
on the campus.7 0 For reasons that were not entirely clear, they
decided to perform a ramp inspection of the helicopters. 7 ' Escorted by the contractor, they entered the restricted helicopter
operating area and approached a ground guide that was controlling one of the helicopters as it was removing and dropping
off old rooftop air conditioning units.7 2 They stated their intention was to inspect the helicopters and asked that they be called
when the helicopters were next on the ground.7 3
The lift operation involved the removal and replacement of
approximately 300 air conditioning units at the school over a
holiday weekend." Time was of the essence. Unaccustomed to
having to stop an operation midstream to accommodate FAA
inspectors, and disturbed by the inspectors' entry into the restricted operating area (an apparent safety violation), the operator, 5-State Helicopters, was not pleased.7 5
69 Brian Novickis was the lead inspector. John Cox was in training at the time.
For the most part, it appeared that Cox had little active involvement in the matters at issue.
70 See 5-State Helicopters, Inc. v. Cox, 146 S.W.3d 254, 256 (Tex.App.-Fort
Worth 2004, pet. Denied).
Id.
72 Brief of John E. Cox and Bryan Novickis at app. 2, 5-State Helicopters, Inc.
71

(No. 02-03-00205-CV) [hereinafter Cox and Novickis Brief]; First Supplemental
Clerk's Record at 37, 5-State Helicopters, Inc. (No. 02-03-00205-CV) [hereinafter
First Supplenment Clerk's Record].
73 First Supplemental Clerk's Record, supra note 72.
74

Id.

at 40.

During rotorcraft external-load operations conducted under FAR Part 133,
the area underneath and adjacent to the operation must be kept clear of personnel and moveable property in the event the load should either fall because of
mechanical problems or need to be jettisoned because of control problems. As
in the case of thisjob, the area is usually barricaded and patrolled by law enforcement personnel (in this case, campus police) to keep non-essential persons out.
Here, the campus personnel and the HVAC contractor assumed that the FAA
personnel were allowed into the operating area. Since this incident, the Fort
Worth FSDO has made it clear that unless there is an immediate hazard that
75
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When the FAA inspectors arrived at the ramp after the helicopters had landed, the operator challenged them.7" The ensuing "discussion" was reported to be somewhat heated.7 7
Nevertheless, the inspection proceeded with the permission of
the operator.7 8 One minor discrepancy was found-the flight
manual was not found in one of the helicopters.7 ' Testimony
established that the flight manual had been placed in a briefcase
in order to prevent it from getting wet during storms the previous night.8 0
The inspectors noted several other anomalies, but it was unclear at the time whether they were in fact violations.8 1 Principal
among these was the installation of an auxiliary battery in the
cargo compartment of one of the helicopters.8 2 The operator
explained that the installation was approved and that the air83
craft records contained an FAA Form 337 to that effect.
After the inspection was complete, the operation resumed.8 4
Several days later, 5-State sent a letter of complaint to the Manager of the Fort Worth FSDO.8 5 It complained that the inspectors, by entering the restricted operating area and engaging the
ground guide, had created an unsafe condition.8 6 It also complained that one of the inspectors refused to provide official
identification and that the inspection was unnecessarily long (almost two hours).8 7 The letter commented on the specific complaints the inspectors had made during the inspection and
characterized the conduct of the inspectors as "nit-picking" in
an attempt to find some type of violation.88 They asked that the
FSDO Manager investigate.8 9
must be corrected, FAA inspectors are not to enter an operating area. See id. at
116.
76 Cox and Novickis Brief, supra note 72 at app. 2.
77 Id. at app 3.
78 Id. at app. 2.
71 Conditional Cross-Brief of 5-State Helicopters, Inc. at 2, 5-State Helicopters,
Inc. (No. 02-03-00205-CV) [hereinafter Conditional Cross-Brief].
80 Id.
81 Id.
82

5-State Helicopters, Inc., 146 S.W.3d at 256, 258.

8., Conditional Cross-Brief, supra note 79, at 2.
84

Cox and Novickis Brief, supra note 72, at app. 2.

85 5-State Helicopters, Inc., 146 S.W.3d at 256, 258.
86
87

Id. at 256; Cox and Novickis Brief, supra note 72, at app. 2.
Cox and Novickis Brief, supra note 72, at app. 2.

Id.
84 5-State Helicopters, Inc., 146 S.W. 3d at 256.
88
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Upon an alleged informal response that nothing would happen with their complaints, the operator contacted the Helicopter Association International (HAI), a professional trade
association, which arranged a conversation with two FAA officials in Washington, D.C.9" Those officials advised 5-State that it
should send a copy of its complaint to the FAA regional office at
Fort Worth, which 5-State did. 91 Along with its letter to the
Southwest Region, 5-State added an additional assertion that a
contractor had related to 5-State that the inspectors told a
nearby Wal-Mart cashier that they had "shut down" the helicopter operation and had "kept a disaster from happening. '92 Allegedly, the contractor heard about this the day after the
inspection.93
When 5-State learned of the latest allegation, it was understandably upset. 94 In the past, because of the dangerous and
highly visible nature of 5-State's work, mostly in urban areas,
and because of the fact that most of its lift work was performed
pursuant to a Congested Area Plan approved by the FAA, it had
been visited routinely by FAA representatives.9 5 5-State's operations were considered by many in several different FSDO's to be
exemplary. 96 In fact, 5-State's operations and facilities were
often used by safety inspectors as a training ground for new inspectors.97 During the course of its many inspections, not one
violation had ever been found; the company's accident and incident record was spotless-a fact of which the company was extremely proud.98
Between December 1998 and January 1999, 5-State was subjected to no less than four "follow-up" inspections related to this
Waco incident.9 9 The result of each was the same-no viola9o Brief of 5-State Helicopters, Inc. at 4-5, 5-State Helicopters, Inc. (No. 02-0300205-CV) [hereinafter 5-State Helicopter Brief].
91 Id.
92 Id.; Cox and Novickis Brief, supra note 72, at app. 3.
93 5-State Helicopters Brief, supra note 90, at 4-5.
94 Cox and Novickis Brief, supra note 72, at app. 3.
95 Id.
96 Reporter's Record Vol. V at 245-46, 5-State Helicopters, Inc. (No. 02-03-00205CV) [hereinafter Reporter's Record Vol. V].
97 Id.
98 Id. at 203.
- The fourth, and final, inspection was conducted by FAA Regional Office
staff and was a part of the only official investigation into the conduct of the
inspectors. The other three were initiated by undetermined persons at the Fort
Worth FSDO. All of the inspections were related to the specific observations/
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tions were found."" One Dallas FSDO inspector reported that
his inspection was at the request of "someone" in Fort Worth
and he characterized this follow-up inspection as a "fishing" expedition, predicated on regulations.'' The Dallas inspector
also reported that the complaining inspector told him that they
had "shut down" the Waco job (notably, the same phrase attributed to having been used by the Wal-Mart cashier)." 2 Further,
the Manager of the Fort Worth FSDO admitted that the performance of multiple follow-up inspections, particularly after
finding no prior violations, was "unusual."' 3
The second letter sent by 5-State resulted in an investigation
of the conduct of the Waco inspectors by the Southwest Region." 4 In March 1998, 5-State received notice from the Southwest Region that the investigation had been concluded. 10 5 The
letter noted, among other things, that the entry of the inspectors into the operating area was indeed a safety issue and was
being addressed.' 0 6 The letter confirmed a conversation by the
inspectors about the inspection, but as the Southwest Region
did not speak to anyone other than the inspectors about that
issue, the Region was unable to establish any events other than
those described by the inspectors.0 7 The letter stated that the
issues substantiated by the investigation had been addressed
with the personnel involved.10 8
concerns of the inspectors at the Waco inspection. 5-State Helicopters, Inc., 146
S.W.3d at 258; Conditional Cross-Brief, supra note 79, at 2.
100 Reporter's Record Vol. V, supra note 96, at 194-98.
101 Reporter's Record Vol. IX at Exhibit 18, 5-State Helicopters, Inc. (No. 02-0300205-CV).
102 Id.
103 Reporter's Record Vol. V, supra note 96, at 117-18.
In fact, FAA Order
2150.3A, Paragraph 203 states that "[i]f the evidence fails to support a violation
or demonstrate a lack of qualifications or competency of a certificate holder,
then neither administrative nor legal enforcement action is appropriate." When
the first follow-up inspection failed to find any evidence of a violation or noncompliance, that should have been the end of it.
104 5-State Helicopters, Inc., 146 S.W.3d at 256.
105 Id.
106 See id. By a Memorandum dated July 21, 1999, FSDO Managers were notified by the FAA of the requirement that inspectors needed to be knowledgeable
of the Congested Area Plan and that they should consider themselves non-participants, limit entry into the operating area unless operations are ceased or a safety
hazard exists that requires immediate action, and not interfere with the operation or cause unreasonable delays.
107 See id.

108 See id.
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Five days later, on March 30, 1999, Inspector Novickis sent a
letter advising 5-State that a single violation had been noted (the
absence of the flight manual), but that legal enforcement action
would not be pursued and that the case was considered
closed. 19

B. THE LAWSUIT
On November 19, 1999, the inspectors filed personal suits in
state district court, in Tarrant County, Texas, alleging that 5State Helicopters' letters were false and misleading and that the
resulting investigation into the incident by the Southwest Region "brought shame, embarrassment, humiliation and mental
anguish" to the inspectors, damaging their reputation within the
work place and within their profession. 0 They further claimed
that the letters exposed the inspectors to financial injury and
caused them shame, embarrassment, humiliation, mental pain
and anguish, lost earning capacity, loss of enjoyment of life, and
loss of reputation."' In addition to defamation, the inspectors
also alleged tortious
interference with their contractual relations
12
with the FAA.'
C.

QUASI-JUDICLAL PRIVILEGE

Early in this litigation, research by 5-State's counsel suggested
that any investigation by the FAA constituted a quasi-judicial
process for which an absolute privilege applied." 3
-09 Administrative letters issued by the FAA are not appealable, but remain on
record for two years.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. 5-State was not served with the complaint until almost ten months later,
on September 10, 2000. Limitations was an issue in the case as well, but is not
relevant to this discussion. It is also only noted that the defense filed a counterclaim against the inspectors which could have been removed to a United States
District Court under the Westfall Act (the Federal Employees Liability Reform
and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, Pub.L.No. 100-694, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1), which

potentially grants absolute tort immunity to government employees for acts committed within the course and scope of their employment. In enacting the
Westfall Act, the Congress desired to have these tort suits decided in a federal
forum, a "presumably level playing field," at least for the government. See Nevarez
v. United States, 903 F. Supp. 1094, 1096 (W.D. Tex.), rev'd on other grounds, 95
F.3d 1149, on remand 957 F. Supp. 884 (1995). In our case, the FAA inspectors
"presumably" did not want a "level playing field" because they elected not to remove the counterclaim, which would have resulted in the complete case being
removed to a federal district court. In fairness to the agency, it was apparently
unaware of this action until after it was commenced.
13 See Shanks, 169 F.3d at 993-94; Reagan, 166 S.W.2d at 912-13.
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Texas state courts have recognized that absolute immunity attaches to certain situations involving the administration of the
functions of the branches of government.1 4 Absolute privilege
applies to quasi-judicial proceedings as well,' 15 including certain
proceedings before governmental agencies."'
Texas courts have recognized six factors that are relevant to a
determination of whether proceedings are quasi-judicial for purposes of absolute immunity:
(1) The power to exercise judgment and discretion;
(2) The power to hear and determine or ascertain facts
and decide;
(3) The power to make binding orders and judgments;
(4) The power to affect the personal or property rights of
private persons;
(5) The power to examine witnesses, to compel the attendance of witnesses, and to hear the litigation of issues on
a hearing; and
(6) The power to enforce decisions or impose penalties." 7
A proceeding need not meet all of the criteria to be considered quasi-judicial." 8
In addressing whether the National Transportation Safety
Board ("NTSB") is a quasi-judicial agency, the court in Shanks v.
Alliedsignal, Inc. observed: "[T]he leading Texas Supreme Court
case on quasi-judicial proceedings noted that an agency proceeding may be deemed quasi-judicial simply where a statute
confers upon the agency "the power to conduct investigations
and hearings."119 Expressed another way, "[a] quasi-judicial
power has been described as the power to investigate and to
draw conclusions from such investigations [citation omitted] or
the authority to redress grievances."120
Hurlbut, 749 S.W.2d at 768.
Reagan, 166 S.W.2d at 912.
116 Matta v.May, 118 F.3d 410, 415 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying Texas law).
117 Shanks, 169 F.3d at 994 (applying Texas law).
1's Id.; Parker v. Holbrook, 647 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st
Dist.] 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
119Shanks, 169 F.3d at 994 (citing Reagan, 166 S.W.2d at 913).
120 Gallegos v. Escalon, 993 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1999,
no pet.) (citing Parker,647 S.W.2d at 695 and McAfee v. Feller, 425 S.W.2d 56, 5758 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, no writ)). Further, quasi-judicial
immunity has been extended in Texas to: (1) the Texas State Board of Medical
Examiners, Ramirez v. Texas State Board of Medical Examiners, 927 S.W.2d 770, 773
(Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no writ); (2) a school board grievance process hearing,
Hernandez v. Hayes, 931 S.W.2d 648, 654 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ de114

115
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Determining that NTSB proceedings were entitled to absolute
immunity, the court in Shanks found that the Board's proceedings satisfied at least the first, second and, fifth of the requisite
criteria for absolute immunity in Texas. 12' Further, the Shanks
court found only two circumstances in which Texas courts have
found that communications to government agencies are not entitled to absolute immunity. 122 The first involved unsolicited
communications to law enforcement officials, when such statements are made in advance of any formal proceeding or investigation.123 Texas courts have also denied absolute immunity
where the challenged communications are made to agencies
that issue mere recommendations or preliminary findings. 124
However, "Texas courts have clarified that when communications relate to an ongoing proceeding, absolute immunity still
' 125

applies."

When an FAA inspector encounters a violation, there are,
with certain exceptions and excluding medical denial cases, generally three choices. The FAA can (1) handle the matter administratively (by issuing a warning or a letter of correction that
requires additional training); (2) seek a civil penalty (fine) or
propose to suspend or revoke the airman or operating certificate of the individual or business entity that committed the violation (legal enforcement action); or (3) terminate the
investigation without further action. 126
nied); (3) the National Railroad Labor Board, Special Board of Adjustment proceedings, Lane v. Port Terminal tR. Ass'n, 821 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied); (4) Texas Railroad Commission proceedings, Aransas Harbor Terminal Ry. Co.v.Taber,235 S.W. 841, 843 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1921); and (5) proceedings before a municipal board of aldermen, Town of
S.Padre Island v.Jacobs, 736 S.W.2d 134, 144 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986,
writ denied).
121 Shanks, 169 F.3d at 994.
122

Id.

Id. (citing Hurlbut, 749 S.W.2d at 768 and Zarate v. Cortinas, 553 S.W.2d
652, 655 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1977, no writ)). Zarate was a case that
did not involve communications to a quasijudicial body, and in fact, the court in
Zarate recognized the absolute privilege afforded to communications to a quasijudicial body. In discussing and distinguishing Reagan v. GuardianLife Insurance
Co., the Zarate court recognized "[t]he communication in the Reagan case was
from an insurance company to the insurance commission which is a quasijudicial
body." Zarate, 553 S.W.2d at 655 (citing Reagan v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 166
S.W.2d 909 (Tex. 1942)).
124 Shanks, 169 F.3d at 994.
125 Id. (citing Thomas v. Bracey, 940 S.W.2d 340, 343 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1997, no writ)).
126 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 13.5(h), 13.11 (2005).
123
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The process generally takes the following steps: 127
a. The aviation safety inspector believes a violation of the
Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) has been committed.
b. A letter of investigation is sent to the alleged violator by
the inspector.
c. The inspector completes his or her investigation and
prepares an Enforcement Investigative Report (EIR). If
the inspector determines that the matter does not
require legal enforcement action, he or she may take
administrative action in disposing of the case by issuing
a "Warning Notice" or "Letter of Correction."
d. If the inspector believes that legal enforcement action is
warranted, the EIR is sent to the Regional Counsel with
a recommendation for either a civil penalty or certificate
action.
e. Legal enforcement actions are described in Subpart C of
Part 13 of the FAR, 14 C.F.R. §13.13 et. seq.' 28 While
there are other extraordinary actions that the FAA take,
such as the seizure of aircraft 121 or the temporary
grounding of unsafe air carrier aircraft 3 ° the typical
choices are either the imposition of a civil penalty or the
suspension or revocation of an FAA-issued certificate.
f, Legal enforcement actions are the formal adjudication
of the guilt or innocence of the respondents because
final orders are issued. There is an opportunity for trialtype hearings, required to be determined on the record
under the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act.'
Those
decisions may be ultimately reviewed only by federal
2
appellate courts, not by any trial court.1
g. If the decision is made to impose a civil penalty of
$50,000 or less upon an individual or small business to
improse, or $400,000 or less upon anyone else, the FAA
sends a Notice of Proposed Civil Penalty to the person
charged with the violation.1 3 Ultimately, a decision is
127 This description of the process includes the changes made by the Vision
100-Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-176, 117 Stat.
2490 (2003) (effective Dec. 12, 2003).
128 14 C.F.R. §§ 13.13-.29 (2005).
'29 14 C.F.R. § 13.17 (2005).
130 49 U.S.C. § 44713(c) (2005).
13, Administrative Procedure Act, § 5 U.S.C. 554 (2005).
132 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a) (2005).
133 14 C.F.R. § 13.16(b) (2005).
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made by the Administrator of the FAA, who may affirm
an Order Assessing Civil Penalty, after an opportunity
for a trial-type hearing before a DOT Administrative Law
Judge. If the assessment is against an individual acting
as a pilot, flight engineer, mechanic, or repairman, the
matter is heard by the NTSB. Absent an appeal to a
United States court of appeals, an Order becomes final
and subject to collection action by the Attorney General.
Civil penalties in excess of these amounts are enforced
through proceedings filed directly in the United States
district courts; however, in cases under the hazardous
materials regulations, the FAA will prosecute hazardous
materials (HAZMAT)13 1 violations regardless of the
amount of the civil penalty. 13 5 Often, those cases, which
are assessed at $240 to $27,500 per violation, may result
in an Order of Assessment by the FAA Administrator of
penalties that sometime reach several million dollars.
h. If the FAA decides to revoke or suspend an FAA issued
certificate, a proposal is issued.1 36 Unless there is an
emergency safety issue, in which case a certificate can be
suspended or revoked immediately,1 3 7 certificate actions
normally begin with a Notice of Proposed Certificate
Action which, after the opportunity for informal procedures, leads to an FAA Order revoking or suspending
the subject certificate. That Order can be appealed to
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). If so,
the certificate action will be tried before an NTSB
Administrative LawJudge ("ALJ"). 3 8 The AL's decision
may be appealed to the full NTSB and final action there
is reviewable by a U.S. Court of Appeals. 1 39 During this
process, the NTSB is requiredby statute to give deference
to the FAA's policies and interpretation of its own regu140
lations.
Since this process is more extensive than that described and
considered in Shanks,"' an inspection initiated by an FAA in134
135
136
137

138
139
14
141

Also known as "Dangerous Goods" in international agreements.
49 C.F.R. § 171.1-.21 (2005); 14 C.F.R. § 13.16, .201-.235 (2005).
14 C.F.R. § 13.19 (2005).
49 U.S.C. § 44709(e)(2) (2005).

49 U.S.C. § 821 (2005).
49 U.S.C. § 46110 (2005).
49 U.S.C. §§ 44709(d) (3), 46301(d) (5) (C) (2005).
Shanks, 169 F.3d at 994-95.
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spector should appear, even to a casual observer, as initiating
the type of quasi-judicial process contemplated by Texas law and
from which no action in defamation can arise.
It was the opinion of 5-State's counsel that the quasi-judicial
power of most, if not all, of the agencies found to be quasi-judicial in nature, including the NTSB, pale in comparison to the
powers of the FAA.' 4 2 Further bolstered by an affidavit by a former FAA counsel, which laid out in detail the functions of the
FAA in regard to the tests outlined in Shanks, 5-State asserted
that FAA proceedings actually satisfy all six of the criteria:
(1) The FAA has the power to exercise judgment and
discretion. 4 '
(2) The FAA, through the statutory enforcement process,
has the power to hear and determine or ascertain facts
and decide.' 44
(3) The FAA has the power to make binding orders and
45

judgments. 1

(4) The FAA has power, through certificate actions or civil
penalty assessments, to affect the personal or property
rights of private persons." '
(5) The FAA has the power to examine witnesses, to comand to hear the litigapel the attendance of witnesses,
7
tion of issues on a hearing. 1

(6) The FAA has the power to enforce decisions or impose
penalties. 148

In a fairly "all fours" case, the Dallas Court of Appeals addressed nearly the exact circumstance. In Putter v. Anderson, the
parents of a teenager who had been arrested orally complained
about the treatment of their son to the Dallas Police Department's Internal Affairs Division ("LAD").' 49 When the police department informed the parents that no consideration could be
given to their complaints unless they were reduced to writing,
the parents sent a letter. 150 The officer who was the subject of
Compare 14 C.F.R. §13 (2005), with Shanks, 169 F.3d at 994-95.
See 49 U.S.C. §§ 5123, 44709, 46101, 46106 & 46304 (2005); 14 C.F.R.
§ 13.1-.401 (2005).
144 See5 U.S.C. § 554 (2005); 49 U.S.C. §§ 46102, 46110 (2005); 14 C.F.R. § 13.
145 See 5 U.S.C. § 554, 49 U.S.C. §§ 46102 & 46110; 14 C.F.R. § 13.
146 See 49 U.S.C. §§ 5123, 44709, 46101, 46106, 46110 & 46304; 14 C.F.R. § 13.
147 See 49 U.S.C. § 46104 (2005); 14 C.F.R. § 13.
148 See 49 U.S.C. §§ 5123, 44709, 46101, 46106 & 46304; 14 C.F.R. § 13.
149 Putter v. Anderson, 601 S.W.2d 73, 75 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
150 Id.
142
143
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the complaint asserted that the first letter and a second letter
sent by the parents to the LAD following a second arrest of the
son by the same officer were defamatory. 151 Evidence showed
that the letters invoked a police department regulation imposing a duty to make an investigation and to draw conclusions 15as2
to whether the complaints about the officer were sustained.
Relying upon Guardian Life Insurance Co., the Dallas Court held
that the IAD was a quasi-judicial body for the purposes of determining "absolute privilege" because it had the power to investigate and to draw conclusions from such investigation. 153 As a
consequence, the two letters were held to be "absolutely privileged" and "no cause of action ...

[could be] predicated" upon

them. 1 54 Simply put, the parents made a complaint to the instructed entity that had the duty to investigate the complaint
and make a determination of its sustainability. Such communication was "absolutely privileged" and immune from suit, regardless of the falsity55of the communication or the malicious
intent of the author.1

On the strength of such analysis and legal support, 5-State
filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis of absolute
privilege. 56 The trial judge denied the motion without
comment. 157
D.

THE TRIAL

The case was tried to a jury. 58 At the end of trial, Plaintiffs
elected to have the case submitted to the jury solely on a theory
of tortious interference with contract, dropping the defamation
claim and asserting that actual malice need not be submitted to
the jury for the claim. 59 In response to the Special Issues, the
jury found, among other things, that Defendants did interfere
151
152

Id.
Id.

Id. at 76-77.
Id. at 77.
155 See Reagan, 155 S.W.2d at 912.
156 5-State Helicopters, Inc., 146 S.W. 3d at 256 n.2.
153

154

157

Id.

Id. at 256.
An actual malice question was submitted to the jury; however, over defense
objections and contrary to law, it included an instruction that actual malice existed if mere intent to cause injury was present. 5-State Helicopters Brief, supra
note 90 at app. C.
158
159
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with Plaintiffs' contract of employment and that they acted with
malice."1"1

I
The jury awarded Plaintiffs $110,000. 6'

In a post-trial interview, jurors provided several interesting
revelations. When asked if they believed that 5-State Helicopters
knew any of the allegations, particularly the Wal-Mart allegation,
to be false, the jury members said no, they did not see any evidence that 5-State had any reason to believe the allegations were
false.'1 2 But, they did feel that 5-State should have investigated

the allegations before they wrote the letter. 163
When queried about damages, the jurors acknowledged that
there was no evidence of specific damages; they simply picked a
number that they thought would "send a message" to the defendants. 16 The jurors also indicated that, after determining
that one of defendant's witnesses was not credible, they pretty
much made up their mind. 16 5 The jurors characterized their
"message" in terms unrelated to the Special Issues within the
Judge's instructions.'
Very simply, they felt it was "wrong" for
defendants to complain about the inspectors to their employer
without fully investigating the matter first.167

E.

APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

The judgment was appealed to the Fort Worth Court of Appeals on numerous grounds, including that Plaintiffs' claims
were barred by limitations, barred by quasi-judicial immunity,
and that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to
support the verdict.'6 8 Specific evidentiary issues involved the
16-

Id.

161 Id.

162 Author Chris Kilgore was trial counsel and conducted post-trial interviews
with jury members.
163 When the standard is malice, there is no legal duty to investigate. Curtis
Publ'g Co., 388 U.S. at 153. Defendant asked for an issue or instruction so stating,
but Defendant's submissions were denied.
164 Post-trial interviews with jurors by Chris Kilgore.
165 Id.
166

Id.

167 We

stress again the legal standard that failure to investigate, even when a
reasonably prudent person would have done so, is not sufficient to establish actual malice. Harte-Hankes, 491 U.S. at 688; Doubleday & Co. v. Rogers, 674
S.W.2d 751, 756 (Tex. 1984).
168 5-State Helicopters, 146 S.W. 3d at 255-56. Although not expanded here,
there were significant evidentiary issues regarding damages and actual malice.
The inspectors stated they "felt" their reputations had been damaged, but had no
evidence of that. They were not reprimanded and not disciplined. Their supervisor testified that from his perspective, their reputations had not been harmed.
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submission of the tortious interference claim, damages, and the
1 69
insufficiency of the actual malice instruction.
On July 29, 2004, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals issued its
opinion, reversing the trial court and rendering judgment
for
170
defendants on the basis of quasi-judicial immunity.
First, the Court of Appeals recognized the long history of jurisprudence and public policy in Texas affording absolute immunity to communications related to both proposed and
existing judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings.' 7 ' Further, the
Court reiterated that it is a question of law [w] hether an alleged
defamatory statement is related to a proposed or existing judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding," and that "all doubts should be
resolved in favor of the communication's relation to the
'
proceeding. 172
While stating that the plaintiff did not dispute the FAA's
quasi-judicial status, the court nonetheless examined the powers
and process of the FAA and held that the FAA is a quasi-judicial
body.173 The Court noted that "a proceeding is quasi-judicial in
nature if it is conducted by a governmental executive officer,
board or commission that has the authority to hear and decide
the matters coming before it or to redress the grievances of
which it takes cognizance.' 174 "Even communications made in
contemplation of or preliminary to a quasi-judicial proceeding
are privileged if they concern a matter that the quasi-judicial
body is authorized to investigate and decide. 175
The Court reiterated the public policy behind protecting
communications in such proceedings. "[E]very citizen should
have the unqualified right to appeal to governmental agencies
One inspector later resigned from the FAA to pursue another job opportunity,
and when that did not work out, he was rehired by the FAA. The other received
regular promotions and advancements.
169

Id.

Id. at 259. Finding that plaintiffs' claims were barred as a matter of law, it
was not necessary for the Court of Appeals to address the other issues.
171 Id. at 256-57.
172 Id. at 257.
173Id. at 257-58.
174 Id. at 257 (citing Attaya v. Shoukfeh, 962 S.W.2d 237, 239 (Tex. App.Amarillo 1998, pet. denied)).
1755-State Helicopters, 146 S.W.3d at 257 (citing Reagan, 166 S.W.2d at 913, Attaya, 962 S.W.2d at 238-39, Rose v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 907 S.W.2d 639, 641-42
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no writ), and Putter, 601 S.W.2d at 75-77 (all
holding that a private citizen's complaint may be the first step in a quasi-judicial
proceeding if the governmental entity has the duty or authority of investigate and
resolve same)).
170
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for redress 'without the fear of being called to answer in damages'. . ,
"The absolute privilege is intended to protect the
integrity of the process and ensure that the quasi-judicial decision-making body gets the information it needs."' 7 7
Considering the functions of the FAA as previously established by defendants, the court of appeals easily determined that
(1) the FAA's quasi-judicial status, (2) the FAA's actions stemming from the November 1998 inspection constituted a quasijudicial proceeding; and (3) defendants' statements were related to that proceeding. 7 ' The Court specifically held:
[B]ecause appellants' two letters were related to a matter that the
FAA was authorized to investigate and determine-whether appellants' aircraft were in compliance with federal aviation lawsappellants' statements in their letters were related to a quasi-judicial proceeding and were absolutely privileged, regardless of the
truth, falsity, or malicious nature of the statements. Moreover,
both appellees' claim for libel and their claim for tortious interference with contract are for defamation-type damages based on
the allegedly libelous communications; therefore, the absolute
privilege doctrine bars both claims.' 7 9
As such, strong precedent now exists that establishes the FAA
as a quasi-judicial body. Therefore, inspections conducted by
FAA inspectors constitute quasi-judicial proceedings and communications related to these proceeding will be afforded an absolute privilege or immunity.
Another appealed issue warrants mention. Plaintiffs withdrew
their defamation claim and submitted the case on the theory of
tortious interference with contract,"8 " notwithstanding the fact
that no evidence of an employment contract or of a contractual
relationship, other than the inspectors' own characterizations,
was ever introduced at trial. 8 ' 5-State pointed out on appeal
that plaintiffs' characterizations of their employment with the
FAA as a "contract" was erroneous; particularly with the attempted implication of civil service protections as forming some
sort of "contract."' 8 2 Established law demonstrates that federal
176

5-State Helicopters, 146 S.W.3d at 257 (citing Attaya, 962 S.W.2d at 239).

177

Id.

Id. at 257-58.
Id. at 259.
180 5-State Helicopters Brief, supra note 90, at app. C.
I'l Reply Brief of 5-State Helicopters, Inc. at 7-10, 5-State Helicopters, Inc. (No.
02-03-00205-CV).
182 Id.
178
179
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employment is a matter of legal status pursuant to statutes and
regulations rather than a matter of contract and thus the inspectors' employment status is "statutory rather than contractual. ' l 3
F.

THE PLAYING FIELD Is LEVELED

Federal statutes authorize a citizen to file a complaint in writing and require the FAA to investigate the complaint. 84 The
FARs specifically require complaints to be made to an FAA regional or district office. Further, complaints must be reviewed,
investigated, and determined whether they are sustainable for
further investigation or enforcement. 8 As the FARs stress and
encourage citizens to provide the FAA with information regarding what is believed to be violations of the regulations, the same
principle holds that citizens and entities that are the subjects of
FAA regulation should not be discouraged from disclosing information to the FAA for fear of being subjected to claims for defamation. The court in Putter v. Anderson recognized this
principle, which now has been recognized by a court directly
186
involving the FAA.

The inspectors, on the other hand, certainly have ample protection. They have governmental immunity for suit. 18 7 Further,

should a citizen's complaint result in investigation, disciplinary
action or enforcement, federal statutes ' and regulations afford
the inspectors meticulous "due process. 18
In summary, the court of appeals in 5-State Helicopters can be
seen to have "leveled the playing field"- at least in Texas. 189
183 Hedman v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 304, 308 (1988), affd 915 F.2d 1552
(Fed. Cir. 1990).
184 49 U.S.C. § 46101.
185 14 C.F.R. § 13.1.
186 See Pitler,601 S.W.2d at 73; See also Moore & Assoc. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
604 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ) ("The corollary principle is that the agencies of government, in order to properly perform their functions, should be authorized to call upon any citizen for full disclosure of
information without subjecting the citizen to a claim for libel.").
187 See Westfall Act, Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
188 See 49 U.S.C. § 46101(a) (4).
189 One other case in Texas has involved a defamation suit brought by FAA
inspectors (and may have been a progenitor of the suit brought against 5-State).
In Peshak v. Greer, 13 S.W.3d 421 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.), the
court upheld an actual damages verdict regarding a defamation and malicious
prosecution claim stemming from a complaint an aircraft owner made to the
FAA and police officials accusing an FAA inspector of having broken into his
aircraft. Id. at 424, 427-28. While the court examined the issue of damages avail-
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The plaintiff-inspectors filed a petition for review to the Texas
Supreme Court.'" Mistakenly claiming that an intermediate appellate court in Arizona had addressed the same issue and decided differently, the plaintiffs in 5-State Helicopters asked the
court to overrule over fifty years of jurisprudence in Texas.''
The petition for review was denied without a published opinion
on April 8, 2005.192
G.

ARIZONA LAW IS SIMILAR TO TEXAS

In Lewis v. Oliver, an intermediate court of appeals in Arizona
held that a defendant's allegations that an FAA investigator
committed perjury during an administrative hearing before the
NTSB would be afforded only a qualified privilege.'
Interestingly, the court recognized that other Arizona intermediate appellate courts applied absolute privilege to complaints made to
quasi-judicial bodies, but chose not to follow them in the belief
that only "administrative proceedings" were at issue.194
Further, the Lewis court recognized the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals opinion in Smith v. McDonald'1 5 and in a North Carolina case, Angel v. Ward,19 6 afforded an absolute privilege in administrative proceedings, but construed its own prior case of
Melton v. Slonsky' 9 7 as not granting absolute privilege in administrative proceedings. "I
able in a defamation suit, it is most noteworthy that the issues of quasi-judicial
immunity or absolute privilege were never raised. At a minimum, from the information derived in the opinion it appears that the communications in that case
were not made in relation to a proposed or on-going proceeding initiated by the
FAA, but were instead, similar to the Zarate case, unsolicited statements to law
enforcement officials accusing the inspector of a crime. More importantly, the
issue of the plaintiff's status as a public official, thus requiring proof of actual
malice in any circumstance should absolute privilege not apply, was raised for the
first time on appeal and therefore waived. Id. at 424.
190Petition for review denied by Cox v. 5-State Hilicopters, Inc., No. 04-0950, 2005
Tex. Lexis 309, at *1 (Tex. Apr. 8, 2005).
19, Cox and Novickis Petition for Review at 4-7, Cox (No. 04-0950).
1112Cox, 2005 Tex. LEXIS 309, at *1.
193Lewis v.Oliver, 873 P.2d 668, 673 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
929 (1994).
194Lewis, 873 P.2d at 673. The practitioner is cautioned that while much defamation law among the states is similar, the issue of the characterization of proceedings and what might be deemed as quasi-judicial varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.
195895 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1990).
196258 S.E.2d 788 (N.C.Ct. App. 1979).
197504 P.2d 1288 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973).
"'1Lewis, 873 P.2d at 673.
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Although the Lewis court construed the circumstances before
it as an administrative proceeding rather than quasi-judicial proceeding, it recognized that the law of Arizona applies an absolute privilege to circumstances involving a quasi-judicial body. If
only read in a cursory fashion, the rationale in Lewis may be seen
as contrary to the well-reasoned holding in Shanks that analyzed
and applied Texas law, holding that the NTSB is a quasi-judicial
body.'99 However, insofar as the Texas Court of Appeals in 5State established the quasi-judicial nature of the FAA, even the
Lewis court recognized that Arizona law would afford absolute
privilege.20 0 In that respect, Arizona law does not substantially
differ from established Texas jurisprudence.
FAA VISION:
"To provide the safest, most efficient and responsive aerospacesystem
in the world, and to be the best Federalemployer, continuously improving service to customers and employees".

IV.

FAA Web Site.

CONCLUSION

FAA inspectors, like other government personnel, are entitled
to exercise their personal rights to recourse when they believe
they have been unfairly verbally attacked, but not when the
statements made against them are legally privileged or otherwise
protected speech, as in the case reviewed here- in the context
of a quasi-judicial proceeding. As regulatory enforcement officers, they are subject to criticism, whether warranted or not, as
a natural part of their public duties. In that respect, they are
protected by the shield of governmental tort immunity. Those
199The defamatory statements in Lewis did not take place during the NTSB
proceeding, nor were they truly related to the proceeding itself. A correct reading of the facts in Lewis demonstrates that the complained-of accusations did not
occur during the NTSB investigation. Following the NTSB proceedings, the defendant complained over a "hotline" about the propriety of the initial inspection
and enforcement action. The DOT Inspector General investigated the complaint
and determined no wrongdoing had occurred. After these proceedings, in an
informal meeting, the defendant then made the accusations that the plaintiff had
committed perjury during the NTSB proceedings. Lewis, 873 P.2d at 670. Such
circumstance is clearly distinguishable from the 5-State case where the communications were made directly to the FAA-a quasi-judicial body-and related to the
proceeding. As such, citing Bailey and Drummond, even the Lewis court recognized that Arizona law would similarly afford an absolute privilege.
200 Id. at 672.
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who are the subjects of the regulatory activity should be shielded

as well when making protected statements.
When the cost of proving that you are right may easily reach
six figures, the nuisance value alone of this type of litigation is
not trivial. But the cost of litigation is nothing compared to the
apparent destruction of trust between the FAA and the aviation
community, the chilling effect litigation may have on the free
flow of customer communications to the FAA, and the damage it
could do to important proactive programs such as the Aviation
Safety Report Program (ASRP), the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP), the Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA)
program, and the data recording program.
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ADDENDUM:
Answers to Pop Quiz:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Marbuiy v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
United States v. Singleton, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
Schechter v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
W Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,300 U.S. 379 (1937).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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